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Biased calculations: 
Numeric anchors influence answers to math equations
Abstract
Does desire for an outcome inflate optimism? Previous experiments have produced mixed results 
regarding the desirability bias, with the bulk of supportive findings coming from one paradigm—the 
classic marked-card paradigm in which people make discrete predictions about desirable or 
undesirable cards being drawn from decks. We introduce a biased-guessing account for the effects 
from this paradigm, which posits that people are often realistic in their likelihood assessments, but 
when making a subjectively arbitrary prediction (a guess), they will tend to guess in a desired 
direction. In order to establish the validity of the biased-guessing account and to distinguish it from 
other accounts, we conducted five experiments that tested the desirability bias within the paradigm 
and novel extensions of it. In addition to supporting the biased-guessing account, the findings 
illustrate the critical role of moderators (e.g., type of outcome, type of forecast) for fully 
understanding and predicting desirability biases
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Biased calculations: Numeric anchors influence answers to math
equations
Andrew R. Smith∗ Paul D. Windschitl†
Abstract
People must often perform calculations in order to produce a numeric estimate (e.g., a grocery-store shopper esti-
mating the total price of his or her shopping cart contents). The current studies were designed to test whether estimates
based on calculations are influenced by comparisons with irrelevant anchors. Previous research has demonstrated that
estimates across a wide range of contexts assimilate toward anchors, but none has examined estimates based on cal-
culations. In two studies, we had participants compare the answers to math problems with anchors. In both studies,
participants’ estimates assimilated toward the anchor values. This effect was moderated by time limit such that the
anchoring effects were larger when the participants’ ability to engage in calculations was limited by a restrictive time
limit.
Keywords: anchoring, bias, heuristics, calculations, math, numeric priming, magnitude priming.
1 Introduction
When calculating numeric estimates, people are often
confronted with both relevant and irrelevant information.
For example, a grocery-store shopper who is trying to cal-
culate the total cost of his grocery cart contents might see
that a new gas grill is on sale for $199.99. Will the shop-
per’s estimate be influenced by the irrelevant cost of a
new grill? Or, more generally, are people influenced by
irrelevant numeric values (i.e., anchors) when calculating
numeric estimates?
Numerous studies have demonstrated that estimates
tend to assimilate toward irrelevant anchors (for a re-
view, see Chapman & Johnson, 2002). For example, an-
choring effects have been observed with general knowl-
edge questions like the length of the Mississippi River
and the height of Mount Everest (Jacowitz & Kahne-
man, 1995), criminal sentences (Englich, Mussweiler, &
Strack, 2006), and performance ratings of university pro-
fessors (Thorsteinson, Breier, Atwell, Hamilton & Priv-
ette, 2008). As is evident from the above examples, the
typical anchoring study requires that participants recruit
information from memory and/or make a quantitative es-
timate from primarily non-quantitative information. In
the current studies, we investigated anchoring effects in
a different context—one where participants needed to
perform a calculation to generate their estimate. Even
Data from the studies reported here are available through the jour-
nal’s table-of-contents page.
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though situations like this are fairly common (e.g., esti-
mating the total cost of multiple products, counting calo-
ries consumed in a day, calculating one’s approximate gas
mileage), little is known about how anchors influence es-
timates made from calculations.
There is a classic study that is often cited as an example
of anchoring in calculations, namely a study by Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) in which participants gave lower
estimates of the product of 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 than
of 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1. However, whereas this find-
ing serves as an illustration that anchoring might affect
calculated answers, it is an idiosyncratic example in that
the potential anchors (i.e., the first numbers in the series)
are part of the expressions themselves. Also, the anchors
are informative as to the answer to the expression—again,
because the anchors are part of the problem. Therefore,
the illustration does not necessarily speak to whether and
why an irrelevant anchor that is external to the expression
would influence people’s answers.
Imagine a person needs to solve “728 + 136 + 545 =
?” and has recently been exposed to an irrelevant num-
ber like 824. Would that anchor value, which happens
to be smaller than the factual answer, have any biasing
influence on the person’s solution to the problem? Two
of the most prominent explanations for anchoring effects
would not appear to predict an effect of the anchor. First,
selective accessibility explanations for anchoring effect
do not seem directly relevant to the possibility of find-
ing anchoring with math problems (Mussweiler & Strack,
1999; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; see also, Chapman
& Johnson, 1999). These accounts assume that, when
participants encounter an anchor (e.g., “Is the Missis-
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sippi River longer or shorter than 5000 miles?”), they
first test whether the target is equal to the anchor value
(e.g., “Is the Mississippi River 5000 miles long?”). Be-
cause people tend to engage in hypothesis consistent test-
ing, they will recruit information that is consistent with
the target being equal to the anchor. Selective accessibil-
ity accounts assume that the activated information is se-
mantically related to anchor value (Mussweiler & Strack,
2000, 2001). When participants generate their final es-
timate, they use this biased set of accessible information
to inform their estimate. Although selective accessibil-
ity can explain anchoring effects in many situations, be-
cause the account relies on a biased recruitment of infor-
mation from memory, it does not seem to apply to situ-
ations where people are performing a calculation based
on available information. Furthermore, because selective
accessibility accounts assume anchors increase the acces-
sibility of semantically related information, they have dif-
ficulty explaining anchoring effects with purely numeric
information—as was used in the current studies.
A second account, anchoring and insufficient adjust-
ment (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006; Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1974), proposes a set of processes that
do not seem tenable for explaining how anchors might in-
fluence solutions to math problems. The insufficient ad-
justment accounts suggest that participants use the anchor
as a starting point and then adjust their estimate away
from the anchor value. It is difficult to imagine why or
how one would start an estimate at the anchor while also
solving a math problem. Additionally, the anchors in the
current studies were all externally provided and an adjust-
ment process is only thought to occur from self-generated
anchor (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006).
Although neither the selective accessibility nor insuf-
ficient adjustment accounts would appear to predict an
effect of irrelevant anchors on answers to math problems,
there are two additional accounts that are more amenable
to such a prediction. Numeric and magnitude priming
accounts posit that anchors prime numbers or magni-
tudes similar to the anchor value. For example, partic-
ipants’ arbitrary ID numbers influenced their estimates
of the number of physicians in the phone book (Wilson,
Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Presumably, view-
ing the ID number increased the accessibility of similar
numbers. When participants generated their estimates,
these primed numbers were more likely to come to mind,
thereby influencing their estimates (see also, Critcher &
Gilovich, 2007; Wong & Kwong, 2000). The magni-
tude priming account is similar, but rather than priming
numbers, it assumes that anchors prime magnitude con-
cepts (e.g., “large”, “small”) and these concepts influence
the estimates that people give (Oppenheimer, LeBoeuf,
& Brewer, 2008). For example, in one study, drawing
a long line caused participants give longer estimates for
the length of the Mississippi River as compared to partic-
ipants who drew a short line.
The numeric and magnitude priming accounts underlie
our prediction that irrelevant anchors will influence an-
swers to math problems. Specifically, we propose that,
unless the calculations required by the math problem are
easy, people often generate an approximation of the an-
swer. That is, whereas they might apply some mathemat-
ical rules, people also take shortcuts and estimate rather
than strictly calculate. When people employ this type of
strategy, anchors will exert a biasing influence through
numeric or magnitude priming. That is, participants’ es-
timates will assimilate toward the values or magnitudes
that are made accessible by the anchors. For example, if a
person is exposed to a high anchor (e.g., 6,245), this value
might increase the activation of numeric values near the
anchor (Wilson et al., 1996) or related magnitudes (e.g.,
“large” or “big”; Oppenheimer et al., 2008). Then, while
calculating the answer to a math problem (e.g., 234 + 798
+ 912), a person’s estimate might assimilate toward the
value or magnitude that was made accessible.
In both of our studies, participants answered math
problems after comparisons with anchors. Because the
participants had all the information they needed in or-
der to make unbiased estimates, it was possible that
participants would exclusively use calculation strategies
and therefore arrive at correct, unbiased answers. How-
ever, we used time limits that forced participants to work
quickly. We assumed that a 15 sec time limit would be
enough to prohibit most participants from using a pure
and precise calculation strategy. The important ques-
tion was whether the deviation from the actual solutions
would be systematically biased in the direction of the an-
chor value. In addition to a condition with a 15 second
time limit, we also included a condition with a more se-
vere time limit (4 sec in Study 1 and 5 sec in Study 2).
This allowed us to test whether the effects of the anchor
value would become stronger as time pressure increased.
This pattern would be consistent with the idea that as
the need to estimate (rather than formally calculate) in-
creases, the potential for bias from external anchors also
increases. An alternative data pattern is also plausible,
however. Namely, time pressure might simply increase
error—but not systematically in the direction of the an-
chor.
2 Study 1
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants and design
Seventy-five students from the University of Iowa en-
rolled in an introductory psychology course participated
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as partial fulfillment of their research requirement. This
study was a 2 (Anchor: high/low) x 2 (Time limit: 4/15
sec) x 2 (Time limit order: 4 sec first/15 sec first) mixed
model with anchor and time limit as within subjects fac-
tors and time limit order as the between subjects factor.
Time limit order did not affect estimates in either study
so this factor will not be discussed further.
2.1.2 Math questions and anchors
All of the math questions that the participants saw were
of the form “X1 + X2 + X3 = Y.” To create these questions,
three numbers (i.e., X1, X2, and X3) were randomly gen-
erated for each trial such that the solution (i.e., Y) was
between 1100 and 1900.1 The anchor values were also
randomly determined for each trial; low anchors were be-
tween 700 and 900 and high anchors were between 2100
and 2300. For example, a participant might be asked if
the answer to “728 + 136 + 545 = ?” is more or less
than 824 in the low anchor condition or 2192 in the high
anchor condition.
The anchoring questions were grouped into two
blocks. In a counterbalanced order, participants answered
one block of questions with a 4 second time limit and the
other block with a 15 second time limit. In each block,
participants saw three high and three low anchor ques-
tions in a random order. In total, participants answered
three questions in each of the four conditions (high an-
chor, 4-sec time limit; high anchor, 15-sec time limit; low
anchor, 4-sec time limit; low anchor, 15-sec time limit).
In addition to these critical questions, participants also
answered four filler questions. The filler problems were
identical for all participants and had anchors that were
near the actual answers to the math problems. We in-
cluded filler items to reduce the likelihood that partici-
pants would learn that the anchors were either high or
low.
2.1.3 Procedure
The participants were instructed that they would be an-
swering math equations on a computer and would only
have a short amount of time to view each equation.
Therefore, they should work as quickly and accurately as
possible. The participants first answered 10 practice math
problems. For example, a participant might see the equa-
tion “435 + 587 + 298 = ?” with a text-entry field below
1In Study 1, the computer created the math problems by first gener-
ating three numbers between 111 and 999 and then checking if the sum
of these numbers was between the desired range—1100 and 1900. If the
sum was not between this range, three new random numbers were gen-
erated and checked. This process was repeated until the answer to the
equation was within the desired range. In Study 2, the same procedure
was used, but the randomly generated numbers were between 1111 and
5500 with the requirement that the sum was between 4000 and 8000.
to enter the answer to the equation. After 4 sec, the equa-
tion was erased from the screen, but the text-entry field
remained. Once the participant entered his/her response,
he/she proceeded to the next problem.
After answering the practice problems, the participants
were told that they would be answering a few more math
problems in two stages. Specifically, they were told that
they would first see an equation and compare the answer
of the equation to a “randomly generated number.” Sec-
ond, they would provide the answer to the equation. The
participants were then shown an example to ensure they
understood their task. Next, they were told they would
have a short amount of time to view each equation, so
they should work as quickly and accurately as possible.
Finally, they were told that, if they were unsure of the ex-
act answer to the equation, they should provide their best
estimate.
Each trial began with the presentation of the anchor
value (e.g., “Is the answer to the following equation
smaller or larger than 784?”). After a 3 sec delay, the
equation was displayed (e.g., “564 + 298 + 712”). The
participants indicated whether the answer to the equation
was larger or smaller than the anchor and then typed in
their estimate of the answer to the equation.
Depending on the time limit condition, the equation
was displayed for either 4 or 15 sec. A countdown timer
in the bottom right of the screen indicated the number of
seconds remaining before the equation was erased. After
the participants answered the questions in the first block,
they were told the time limit was changing (from 4 to 15
sec, or vice versa) and then answered the questions in the
second block.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Preliminary analyses
Three participants were dropped from the analyses be-
cause their responses indicated they were not attempting
to provide accurate responses. We also removed a small
number of estimates (7/864 or < 1%) that most likely re-
sulted from typos (e.g., estimates below 100 and above
10,000). Regarding the comparative judgments, partici-
pants correctly identified whether the answer to the equa-
tion was larger or smaller than the anchor on 94.3% of the
trials. Accuracy on these judgments did not differ based
on the anchor or time pressure conditions. Overall, 59 of
the 72 participants (81.9%) answered at least 11 of the 12
comparative judgments correctly.2 Regarding accuracy
of participants’ final answers to the math problems, only
2In both studies, analyses restricted to those participants who an-
swered at least 11 of the 12 comparative judgments correctly did not
differ substantially from analyses including all participants. Similarly,
analyses restricted to only those estimates given after correctly answer-
ing the comparative judgment also reveal significant anchoring effects.
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0.2% and 11.1% of the final answers were exactly cor-
rect in the 4 sec and 15 sec conditions, respectively. Us-
ing a more lenient criterion for accuracy, we found that
only 3.0% and 18.5% of the final answers were within 5
units of the correct answer in the two conditions, respec-
tively. These findings are consistent with our assumption
that a 15 sec time limit would typically be enough to pro-
hibit participants from using a pure and precise calcula-
tion strategy. They also suggest that 4 sec was even more
restrictive in limiting such a strategy.
2.2.2 Main analyses
The key question at hand is whether participants’ final
answers would show a significant bias in the direction
of the anchors. A secondary question was whether this
effect would be enhanced as the time pressure increased
from 15 seconds to 4 seconds.
Because each math problem was randomly generated
for each participant, the actual answers to the problems
could, by chance, differ across the conditions. Therefore,
for each of the 12 anchoring questions, we calculated the
signed deviation of each participant’s estimate from the
actual answer to the equation and then averaged the three
deviation scores within a given condition. It should be
noted that analyses conducted on participants’ raw esti-
mates did not substantively differ from those conducted
on their deviation scores. We conducted a 2 (anchor)
x 2 (time limit) repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on participants’ deviation scores.
Most importantly, there was the predicted main effect
of anchor, F(1, 71) = 17.16, p < .001, partial η2 = .20. Par-
ticipants gave higher estimates after exposure to a high
anchor than a low anchor. There was also a main effect
of time limit, F(1, 71) = 9.28, p = .003, partial η2 = .12;
participants gave higher estimates in the 15 sec condi-
tion. The time limit main effect was not replicated in
Study 2, so we will not discuss it in detail. The two main
effects were qualified by a marginally significant interac-
tion, F(1, 71) = 3.42, p = .07, partial η2 = .05. For ease
of interpretation, Figure 1 plots participants’ average esti-
mate in each condition, rather than their deviation scores.
As can be seen in Figure 1, participants’ estimates were
influenced by the anchor values to a greater degree in the
4 sec condition as compared to the 15 sec condition. Al-
though the anchoring effect was larger in the 4 sec con-
dition, simple-effects tests revealed significant anchoring
effects in both the 4 sec condition, F(1, 71) = 13.79, p <
.001, partial η2 = .16, and the 15 sec condition, F(1, 71)
= 6.55, p = .01, partial η2 = .08.
Figure 1: Participants’ average estimates in Study 1 as a
function of anchor and time limit conditions. Error bars
represent ±1 SE.
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2.3 Discussion
The results of Study 1 show that participants’ answers to
math problems were influenced by anchor values. That is,
their estimates assimilated towards the anchor value. As
discussed earlier, it would seem that the anchoring effects
observed in this particular paradigm must be driven by
numeric or magnitude priming. Presumably, exposure to
the anchor value increased the accessibility of numbers
or magnitudes similar to the anchor, and this increase in
activation influenced the participants’ estimates.
Another interesting finding is that the anchoring effects
were larger when participants’ were under greater time
pressure. There are two closely related characterizations
of this interaction. One possibility is that the anchors
influenced estimates similarly in both time limit condi-
tions, save for the times that the participants were able
to literally calculate their final answer. A second possi-
bility is that even among the set of estimates that were
not achieved through full calculation, time pressure led
to an enhanced influence of anchors. Both of these char-
acterizations are compatible with our overall arguments.
The results from Study 1 are somewhat ambiguous on
which is more valid. If we remove all the responses that
were within 5 units of the correct answer (which removes
3.0% and 18.5% of the responses in the 4 sec and 15 sec
conditions), the results for the anchor X time limit in-
teraction change only slightly, F(1, 69) = 2.32, p = .13,
partial η2 = .03. This suggests that, even among the set of
estimates that were not achieved through full calculation,
time pressure matters. The results of Study 2 provide a
clearer conclusion on this matter.
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3 Study 2
While the results of Study 1 are consistent with the nu-
meric or magnitude priming accounts, there is an alter-
native explanation. It is possible that, even though the
anchors were described as “randomly generated”, the par-
ticipants viewed the anchor value as informative to their
estimate or as a hint to the actual answers (Schwarz,
1994). In Study 2, we used extreme anchors in order
to reduce the likelihood that the participants would view
them as informative or possible answers to the equations.
If the anchoring effects observed in Study 1 were due
to participants viewing the anchors as informative, using
extreme anchors should eliminate or reduce the anchor-
ing effects. However, because the extreme anchors can
still act as primes, the numeric and magnitude priming
accounts predict that participants will show an anchoring
effect even with extreme anchor values.
It is also noteworthy that the math problems in Study
2 were more complex than those in Study 1, which fur-
ther reduced the ability of participants to employ a pure
calculation strategy, even for the 15 sec condition.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants and design
Thirty-two students from the University of Iowa enrolled
in an introductory psychology course participated as par-
tial fulfillment of their research requirement. This study
was a 2 (Anchor: high/low) x 2 (Time limit: 5/15 sec) x
2 (Time limit order: 5 sec first/15 sec first) mixed model
with anchor and time limit as within subjects factors and
time limit order as the between subjects factor.
3.1.2 Math questions and anchors
As in Study 1, the math questions were of the form of
“X1 + X2 + X3 = Y.” In this study, the sum of the numbers
was randomly determined to be between 4,000 and 8,000.
The low anchors were between 500 and 999 while high
anchors were between 11,001 and 11,500. For example, a
participant might be asked if the answer to “1964 + 1297
+ 2636 = ?” is more or less than 783 in the low anchor
condition or 11,243 in the high anchor condition.
3.1.3 Procedure
The procedures were the same as in Study 1 except: 1)
more extreme anchors were used, 2) there were no prac-
tice questions, and 3) the time limit in the low-limit con-
dition was 5 sec rather than 4 sec.
3.2 Results and discussion
3.2.1 Preliminary analyses
We first removed a small number of estimates (7/384 or <
2%) that most likely resulted from typos (e.g., estimates
below 1,000 and above 15,000). On average, participants
answered 95.3% of the comparative judgments correctly.
Accuracy did not differ based on anchor or time pressure
conditions. Overall, 28 of the 32 participants (87.5%) an-
swered at least 11 of the 12 comparative judgments cor-
rectly. Regarding accuracy of participants’ final answers
to the math problems, none of the answers was exactly
correct in the 4 sec condition and only 2.1% were correct
in the 15 sec condition. Even when using a more lenient
criterion for accuracy, none of the final answers in the 4
sec condition and only 3.7% in the 15 sec condition were
within 5 units of the correct answer. As anticipated, it
was quite difficult for participants to precisely calculate
the answers to the math problems in both time pressure
conditions.
3.2.2 Main analyses
As in Study 1, we created deviation scores from the par-
ticipants’ estimates. We then conducted a 2 (anchor) x
2 (time limit) repeated-measures ANOVA on the partic-
ipants’ deviation scores. The ANOVA revealed the pre-
dicted main effect of anchor, F(1, 31) = 13.71, p = .001,
partial η2 = .31. Again, participants gave higher estimates
after being exposed to a high anchor rather than a low an-
chor. Unlike Study 1, there was no main effect of time
limit, F(1, 31) = 2.43, p = .13, partial η2 = .07. There
was, however, a significant anchor X time limit interac-
tion, F(1, 31) = 6.06, p = .02, partial η2 = .16. As can be
seen in Figure 2, participants’ estimates were influenced
by the anchor values to a greater degree in the 5 sec con-
dition than in the 15 sec condition. Simple-effects tests
revealed significant anchoring effects in the 5 sec condi-
tion, F(1, 31) = 12.40, p = .001, partial η2 = .29, and
almost-significant anchoring effects in the 15 sec condi-
tion, F(1, 31) = 3.41, p = .07, partial η2 = .10.
In summary, participants in Study 2 exhibited robust
anchoring effects when using anchors that were quite ex-
treme. It seems unlikely that participants interpreted the
extreme anchors as useful information, yet the influence
of anchors in Study 2 was largely the same as in Study
1. The anchoring effects were again moderated by time
pressure with the more restrictive time pressure leading
to larger anchoring effects. Even when we removed all
the responses that were within 5 units of the correct an-
swer, the results for the anchor X time limit interaction
remained significant, F(1, 31) = 5.64, p = .02, partial η2
= .15. This reveals that, even among the set of estimates
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Figure 2: Participants’ average estimates in Study 2 as a
function of anchor and time limit conditions. Error bars
represent ±1 SE.
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that were not achieved through full calculation, time pres-
sure increases anchoring effects.
4 General discussion
Two key accounts of anchoring—selective accessibility
and insufficient adjustment—would seem to suggest that
anchors will not influence people’s estimates that are
based on calculations. Numeric and magnitude priming
accounts, on the other hand, do predict an effect. Con-
sistent with this prediction, we found that irrelevant an-
chors influenced participants’ answers to math problems.
Another important finding was that limiting participants’
ability to use the provided information increased the mag-
nitude of the anchoring effects. Finally, this effect per-
sisted even when the anchors were extreme relative to the
answers to the math problems.
4.1 Why did time pressure increase anchor-
ing?
A number of studies have found that anchoring effects
from externally provided anchors are immune to cogni-
tive load manipulations (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006;
Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). Therefore, it might seem
odd that time pressure increased anchoring effects in our
studies. We have assumed, however, that people often
perform minimal calculations and then estimate their fi-
nal answer. Putting people under an extreme time pres-
sure will undoubtedly reduce people’s ability to calculate
an accurate response and increase the tendency to esti-
mate the answer. In turn, this will increase the biasing
influence of anchors.
Our results are also consistent with a recent study
demonstrating anchoring effects caused by numeric
or magnitude priming (Blankenship, Wegener, Petty,
Detweiler-Bedell, & Macy, 2008, Experiment 4). Specifi-
cally, when answering general knowledge questions, par-
ticipants exhibited a significant anchoring effect when
cognitive load was high, but no anchoring effect when
cognitive load was low. According to Blankenship et al.,
this occurred because, when under high levels of load,
participants were not able to recruit a significant amount
of relevant information from memory to generate their re-
sponse and were, therefore, influenced by the numbers or
magnitudes that were made accessible by the anchors.
4.2 What was primed, numbers or magni-
tudes?
Our studies were not designed to determine whether nu-
meric or magnitude priming was more responsible for the
observed effects. However, we can speculate about this
issue. Numerous studies have demonstrated that numeric
primes can influence numeric processing (e.g., Brysbaert,
1995; den Heyer & Briand, 1986). For example, a num-
ber such as 66 is named faster when it is preceded by a
close number (65) than a far number (52). Also, compar-
isons between a target and a particular standard are faster
when a prime is similar to the target rather than dissimilar
(Koechlin, Naccache, Block, & Dehaene, 1999). Given
these findings, it seems possible that numeric anchors can
prime numbers related to the anchor value.
However, there are two reasons why magnitude prim-
ing may better serve as the explanation for the effects
observed in the current studies. First, most researchers
agree that, with respect to the specific process of numeric
priming, numbers involving three or more digits are re-
duced into their component values rather than processed
holistically (for a discussion, see Ratinickx, Brysbaert
& Fias, 2005). Therefore, a number like 1,313 might
do more to prime the number 2 than the number 1,657.
Second, numeric priming effects do not generally extend
very far (Reynvoet & Brysbaert, 1999; Reynvoet, Brys-
baert, & Fias, 2002). For example, when using masked
primes, priming with 1 might facilitate the recognition of
2, but not 9. Results from Reynvoet and Brysbaert (1999)
suggest that numbers do not prime values more than 3
away from the prime. In the current studies, the anchors
were always larger than two-digit numbers and the esti-
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mates that the participants gave were generally quite dis-
parate from the anchor values. Therefore, it seems un-
likely that strict numeric priming, at least as it is defined
within the cognitive literature on numeric priming, can
account for the observed anchoring effects. A version of
numeric priming could still be considered viable if a more
liberal definition of numeric priming were used, in which
categories of numbers might be primed (e.g., “upper hun-
dreds,” “lower thousands”).
Also viable is a magnitude priming explanation, first
proposed by Oppenheimer et al. (2008). In one of their
studies, drawing a long line caused participants to give
higher estimates of the length of the Mississippi River.
In another study, drawing long lines increased the likeli-
hood that participants completed the word fragment _all
to form tall. Presumably, drawing a long line primed re-
lated magnitudes, and these magnitudes influenced par-
ticipants’ estimates and performance on the word com-
pletion task. Similar to the effect of drawing long or
short lines, it seems quite possible that the anchors in-
creased the activation of corresponding magnitude repre-
sentations. Only future research can determine whether
magnitude priming or numeric priming of categories of
numbers offer a better explanation for the anchoring ef-
fects we observed.
It is important to note that, although magnitude prim-
ing is our preferred explanation for these results, the
anchoring effects may be driven by other mechanisms.
While our results appear to be inconsistent with the other
accounts of anchoring effects, the studies did not explic-
itly rule out the competing explanations. Furthermore,
we certainly acknowledge that the selective accessibility
and anchoring and insufficient adjustment accounts can
explain anchoring effects observed in other situations.
4.3 Conclusion
In the current studies, participants explicitly considered
the anchor values before providing an estimate. Ad-
mittedly, this explicit consideration of anchor values is
rare in everyday environments. However, Critcher and
Gilovich (2007) demonstrated that “incidentally” pre-
sented anchors, such as the number on the jersey of a
football player, can influence estimates, such as the likeli-
hood that the player would register a sack in an upcoming
game. Their findings, combined with our results, suggest
that incidentally presented anchors—like explicitly con-
sidered anchors—might influence calculations. Further-
more, such an effect might be most robust when people’s
ability (or presumably motivation) to process information
is limited. In short, math done in everyday environments,
where time is short and motivation is less than perfect,
could be routinely biased by anchors in ways that typi-
cally go unnoticed.
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